At the International Space Summit – an initiative of French President, Emmanuel Macron – held at the Grand Palais, Paris, from 9–10 September 2026, the  Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, delivered a speech to an audience comprising representatives of governments, space agencies and industry. In his address, he emphasised the importance of coordinated African action to safeguard satellite spectrum and orbital resources, referring specifically to the efforts of the African Telecommunications Union (ATU) to recover these resources for the continent. His remarks raise two questions: what precisely was recovered, and what measures are needed to translate this achievement into practical benefits for African countries?

The achievement that President Kagame referred to, resulted from a process undertaken over several years. Its principal regulatory basis was Resolution 559, adopted at the World Radiocommunication Conference 2019 (WRC-19). Its African dimension was already described in an ITU publication in May 2024, which reported the recovery of satellite resources for 31 African countries (1). Kagame’s remarks therefore drew attention to an earlier achievement whose implementation remains significant for African space policy (4). While ‘recovering orbital slots’ provides a useful shorthand, a more precise legal and technical explanation is needed to clarify what was secured and what further steps African countries must take to benefit from it.

Why this matters

The concern about unequal access has a longer history. The 1976 Bogotá Declaration asserted sovereign rights over segments of geostationary orbit corresponding to the territories of certain equatorial States (2). It was neither a collective African position nor the foundation of the ITU planning regime. Indeed, the Declaration acknowledged the equitable-access principle already present in Article 33(2) of the 1973 International Telecommunication Convention, while questioning whether it adequately protected developing countries in practice. Its relevance here lies in that concern: technological disparities can constrain future access even where international rules recognise equitable participation.

The ITU framework addresses access through internationally agreed rules on resource use and protection, rather than sovereignty over orbital segments. Article 44 of the ITU Constitution provides its central normative foundation. It recognises radio frequencies and associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit, as limited natural resources. Their use must be rational, efficient and economical, while allowing equitable access and taking account of the special needs of developing countries and the geographical situation of particular countries. Planning gives practical expression of this principle. Its underlying rationale is to preserve meaningful opportunities for countries whose satellite capabilities will develop over time. The successful operation of existing networks does not, by itself, guarantee that another State will be able to implement its planned system in the future. Planning therefore seeks to reconcile present use with future access, while allowing resource sharing and regulatory adjustments under defined conditions.

Recovery under Resolution 599

Appendix 30 of the Radio Regulations governs satellite broadcasting downlinks that carry signals from satellites to receiving users, while Appendix 30A covers the associated feeder links from transmitting earth stations to satellites (3). The plans contained in these Appendices link frequency assignments to specified orbital positions and technical parameters, within a framework of coordination and notification procedures. An assignment is described as ‘degraded’ when its protection against interference has deteriorated. This concerns the conditions under which radio transmissions can operate, rather than the physical deterioration of a satellite or the disappearance of orbital space. An assignment may therefore remain in a plan even though changes in its interference environment make a viable service harder to implement. An ITU-published account identified shortages of regulatory expertise and difficulties in responding to coordination requests as contributing factors, particularly where a failure to respond could be treated as implied agreement.

Resolution 559 established a special procedure under which eligible administrations in Regions 1 and 3 could seek to replace degraded national assignments. The procedure required them to identify suitable orbital positions and frequency channels, submit the corresponding information for both broadcasting and feeder links, and complete the applicable examination and coordination procedures involving the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau (BR) and affected administrations. Administrations then had to request that a World Radiocommunication Conference incorporate the new assignments into the plans, replacing the existing national assignments. Eligibility therefore provided access to the procedure; replacement depended on completing the prescribed steps.

Regional cooperation supported the completion of these national procedures. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) organised practical training in Luanda in January 2020. In February, the African Telecommunications Union (ATU) followed with a workshop for the 31 African administrations, drawing on the earlier regional experience. ITU experts provided technical assistance, while national administrations pursued the necessary coordination. The outcome (11) therefore reflected a combination of national responsibility, regional support and international regulatory procedures. At WRC-23, 41 administrations worldwide secured replacement assignments under Resolution 559, including the 31 African countries whose achievement was subsequently reported by the ATU and SADC (12). For those countries, the recovery improved the regulatory and technical conditions for developing satellite broadcasting services, providing a basis for future implementation.

Regional assistance and national authority

The 2022 proceedings before the Radio Regulations Board (RRB) illustrate the legal distinction between regional assistance and authority to act on behalf of a national administration. 27 administrations requested that the ATU receive specified reminders from the Radiocommunication Bureau and be permitted to respond on behalf of administrations that failed to reply within the prescribed deadlines. Several RRB members, serving as independent experts rather than national representatives, raised questions about the proposed arrangement. Board members Borjón and Jeanty questioned the Board’s authority to confer such powers. The Board’s Vice-Chair, El-Sayed Azzouz, observed that silence could reflect agreement, while fellow member Akira Hashimoto questioned how consultation with the administration concerned would be ensured. Another member, Chantal Beaumier, noted that not all ATU members had joined the submission.

The Director of the Bureau distinguished authorisations granted by individual administrations from the collective request under consideration, explaining that an administration could formally authorise another body to act on its behalf while retaining legal responsibility. The Board agreed that the ATU should receive copies of the specified reminders as an interim measure until the conclusion of WRC-23. It did not, however, approve the proposed arrangement for responses on behalf of administrations that failed to reply, and sought legal advice on the matter. At its 90th meeting, the Board recorded that the Legal Adviser’s opinion confirmed its earlier decisions.

These concerns should not be presented as objections by particular States: RRB members act independently, and do not represent their national administrations. The proceedings instead highlight the importance of defining the scope of regional assistance. Receiving correspondence enables the ATU to monitor deadlines and support national responses; submitting a response with legal consequences on behalf of an administration requires appropriate authorisation. The interim measure facilitated assistance without establishing a general authority for the ATU to take decisions on behalf of its members. The temporary measure is best understood as a limited procedural arrangement. Its express duration precludes interpreting the 2022 decision as a permanent mandate. In institutional terms, it illustrates how regional assistance can be strengthened while preserving national decision-making authority.

This distinction should inform future cooperation. Monitoring correspondence, providing technical and legal advice, and submitting an authorised response on behalf of an administration are distinct functions. Regional expertise can support monitoring and advice, while representation requires a clear mandate specifying its scope and limits. Where a reminder remains unanswered, an agreed procedure should provide for referral to a designated national official, supported by a technical assessment and a draft response. Such arrangements would enable regional support to strengthen national decision-making while maintaining clear responsibility for the resulting decision.

Protecting future use

WRC-23 strengthened protection within the plans while retaining a procedure for handling unanswered coordination requests. Under paragraph 4.1.10d of each of Appendices 30 and 30A, failure to respond within the prescribed deadlines and following the required reminders may still be treated as an absence of objection. In practical terms, this allows a proposed assignment to proceed without being indefinitely delayed by non-response alone. Where assignments in the Regions 1 and 3 Plans are affected, however, this procedure is subject to the safeguards in paragraph 4.1.13bis.

The administration proposing the new assignment must provide an enforceable commitment to comply with specified interference limits, according to the prescribed timetable, when the protected planned assignment is brought into use. The new assignment must also be excluded from calculations that update the protected assignment’s technical reference conditions. Related provisions establish procedures for addressing non-compliance. The reform can therefore be understood as balancing procedural continuity with the protection of future access: proposals may proceed despite administrative silence but remain subject to obligations intended to preserve the affected country’s ability to implement its planned satellite service.

The consequences of non-implementation require a separate distinction. The eight-year deadline for bringing assignments into use under paragraph 4.1.3 applies to new or modified assignments in the List of additional uses, subject to applicable exceptions. Failure to meet that deadline may cause a List assignment to lapse. It does not establish a general expiry rule for national assignments incorporated into the Regions 1 and 3 plans. Any project implementing those assignments must still meet the applicable notification and operational requirements (4). Even where a planned assignment remains available, leaving it unused has a practical cost: the protected opportunity does not translate into services or their associated benefits.

From Protection to Implementation

The next step should be to consolidate the cooperation that enabled the recovery. National administrations, the ATU and regional organisations such as SADC could establish arrangements for jointly monitoring ITU publications and deadlines, supported by a pool of technical and legal specialists. Regular training, documented procedures and reliable institutional records would help preserve expertise when personnel change. Any authority to respond on behalf of a national administration should be expressly defined and communicated to the relevant bodies.

Effective implementation also requires funding beyond the preparation and submission of regulatory filings. Applicable ITU processing charges represent only one component of the overall cost (5). Administrations and operators must also provide for technical studies, coordination, ongoing regulatory compliance, satellite capacity, ground infrastructure and operations. A credible project should therefore identify how these costs will be allocated and how the service will be financed throughout its operating life.

Public and private operators, including those participating in public–private partnerships, can contribute financing and technical expertise, subject to national authorisation and the applicable ITU procedures. Their participation should be governed by clear licences and agreements defining deployment commitments, service obligations, compliance with interference limits and arrangements for service continuity if an operator withdraws. A commercial partnership does not, in itself, transfer the national administration’s international regulatory responsibilities or demonstrate that a recovered assignment has been brought into use.

The African Space Agency (AfSA), the African Union’s specialist space institution inaugurated in Cairo in April 2025, could help connect these efforts with broader capacity-building and development priorities. It could support feasibility studies and cooperation amongst national administrations, research institutions and prospective operators. These contributions would complement the responsibilities of the competent authorities for spectrum procedures and national authorisations. The role proposed here, concerns policy and capacity support, not authority to replace national administrations in ITU procedures.

President Kagame’s remarks draw attention to a concrete achievement of African cooperation. Preserving that achievement requires continued regulatory competence; converting it into effective access requires viable projects and accountable partnerships. The lasting value of that achievement will depend on the institutions, expertise and projects built upon it.

Notes

(1) The 31 African administrations eligible for the special procedure under Resolution 559 (WRC-19) were: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

(2) Congo, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, alongside Colombia, Ecuador and Indonesia argued that the segments of the geostationary orbit corresponding to their territories were subject to their sovereign rights. They maintained that the placement of satellites in those segments required their prior express authorisation and that satellite operations should comply with their national laws, regardless of any question of compliance with ITU rules and procedures.

(3) A feeder link carries signals from an earth station to the satellite for subsequent broadcasting; the downlink carries them from the satellite to receiving users.

(4) ITU, Radio Regulations, 2024 edition, Vol. 2, Appendices 30 and 30A, §§ 4.1.3, 4.1.3bis and 4.1.27–4.1.27bis. These provisions distinguish assignments in the List from incorporation in the Plan. “Bringing into use” is a regulatory milestone requiring actual satellite capability at the notified orbital position; for the applicable geostationary rule, see No. 11.44B and the ITU WRS-24 presentation, slide 23.

(5) Charges depend on the filing category and applicable entitlements or exemptions. An ITU processing charge is not a project’s total regulatory or deployment cost.